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INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
Abstract
The theoretical model of Gaertner (19~4) and Pollak (1976) to analyze interde-
pendence of preferences in the Linear Expenditure System is estimated for a
cross-section of households. The interdependence of consumption of different
households has implications for the stochastic structure of the model and for
the identifiability of its parameters. Both aspects are dealth with.
The empirical results indlcate a significant role played by the inter-
dependence of preferences. One of its implications is that for a household,
predictions of the effects of changes in exogenous variables differ according




In his pioneering study, Duesenberry (1949) gave several kinds of evidence
based on aggregate data to indicate the importance of preference interdepen-
dence for the explanation of consumer behavior. At about the same time Leiben-
stein (1950) extensively discussed various types of interdependencies in con-
sumption behavior of individuals. Of course, these two authors were not the
first ones to discuss preference interdependence. Leibenstein notes, for ex-
ample, that the notion of 'conspicuous consumption' can be traced back as far
as the works of Horace. Since the time the papers by Duesenberry and Leiben-
stein were published, some further work has been done on what has been called
alternatively variable preferences, endogenous preferences, or interdependent
preferences. In Kapteyn et al. (1980) we have given a brief review of most of
this literature.
In the economics literature endogenous preferences are usually assumed
to arise as a result of habit formation (e.g., Pollak and Wales, 1969, Hout-
hakker and Taylor, 19~0, Phlips, 19~2 and 19~4, Manser, 19~6, Spinnewijn,
1981, Phlips and Spinnewijn, 1982, Muellbauer, 1988, Pashardes, 1986, Winder,
1988). Where in the older literature, habit formation was invariably myopic
(or "naive"), in the more recent literature spawned by Spinnewijn (1981) hab-
its are allowed to be rational, i.e. consumers may anticipate the effect of
their current decisions on their future preferences. The empirical evidence on
the extent to which habit formation is myopic or rational is mixed. Pashardes
(1986) finds that entirely myopic habits are rejected by his data, but not
fully rational habits, whereas Muellbauer (1988) finds habits to be predomi-
nantly myopic.
In the context of the Linear Expenditure System (LES), the two forms
of habit formation are basically indistinguishable (Spinnewijn, 1981, Phlips
end Spinnewijn, 1982). As we will be concerned exclusively with the LES, we
can therefore ignore the distinction.
In two rather closely related papers Caertner (19~4) and Pollak (19~6)
have studied some theoretical implications of the incorporation of preference
interdependence in the LES. Darrough, Pollak end Wales (1983) estimate a Qua-
dratic Expenditure System for three separate time series (one British and two
Japanese) of grouped household budget data. They also consider specifications
where some parameters depend on lagged consumption. Since the data are grouped
according to income-demographic cells, one may interpret the dependence of
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parameters on lagged consumption (i.e. the consumption of other people in the
same cell, one period ago) as representing interdependent preferences. The
authors find the specification with lagged consumption included to be empiri-
cally superior to static versions of their model.
Thus we have two theoretical papers within the systems approach that
deal with preference interdependence and one empirical paper that can be in-
terpreted as supporting the notion of interdependent prefprences (but a habit
formation interpretation is possible as well). In our paper we follow the lead
of Gaertner and Pollak, but focus entírely on the econometric and empirical
aspects of preference interdependence in the LES. The choice of the LES as our
framework of analysis is mainly motivated by a desire for simplicity in this
pioneering stage. Future work should extend to other systema.
The paper is organized ss follows. Section 2 presenta the LES with
interdependence incorporated. Section 3 and appendix A concentrate on the
stochastic assumptions required to render the model amenable to estimation on
the basis of a cross-section. In section 4 we consider ísaues of identifica-
tion. Section 5 contains the results of estimating the model for a household
expenditure survey in The Netherlands. Section 6 concludes with some qualifi-
cations, and points at future research.
2. The deterministic part of the model
Our starting point is the Linear Expenditure System (LES):
G
xgn - b~ ' óg yn - hil b~~ . (2.1)
where the index n, n-1,...,N, indicates the N consumers (or houaeholds) in
society;l) the index g, g-1,...,G, indicates goods; xgn denotes the quantity
of good g consumed by individual n; yn is total expenditures; y, with E~r -
1, and bgn are parameters. The system (2.1) arises from the maximizat~on of
the utility function
G
Un(x1.....xG) - gil ~g log(xg - bgn) (2.2)
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subject to the budget constraint
G
E xgn - y ,ng-1
(2.3)
with yn total expenditures of household n.2) Note that a maximization problem
like this Way arise in a rather general setting, like maximization of an in-
tertemporally separable Stone-Geary utility function under a life time budget
constraint. In such circumstances the maximization problem (2.2) -(2.3) ari-
ses in the second stage oF a two-stage budgetting procesa. Introduction of
certain forms of uncertainty or liquidity constraints does not affect the
second stage. See, e.g., Blundell and Walker (1986) and Alessie and Kapteyn
(1989).
We incorporate interdependence of preferences by expressing the para-
metera b~ as a function of consumption by others:
N
bgn - bg0 ' pg kEl w~xgk. w~ - 0. w~ 2 0, kw~ - 1, 0 5 ~g C 1,
(2.4)
with bgC a gcod-specific intercept and gg a good-specific coefficient, end the
w~ reference weights, representing the importance attached by consumer n to
consumer k's expenditures. Intuitively, pg measures the conspicuousness of
good g. The higher pg is, the more one's consumption of good g is influenced
by the consumption of others. The expression Ek-lw~xgk represents mean expen-
ditures on good g in the reference group of consumer n, where the reference
group of individual n is defined as the set of individuals k for whom w~ ) 0.
To allow for differences in household composition, the model is exten-
ded slightly in the following simple way. Let fn be the size of household n,
however defined. It is assumed that the household's committed expenditures on
good g increase with y~gfn, where N1,...,NG are paremeters. This corresponds to
'translating' as defined by Pollak and Wales (1981). Combining preference
interdependence with translating leads to the following adaptation of the
basic model. Let 'x be defined asgn
Xgn ' xgn - ugfn, (2.5)
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then we replace (2.4) by
N
bgn - bgG t Hgfn . ~Bg kEl w~zgk,
x
(2.é)
Notice that (2.6) reduces to bgn - bgG . ugfn in either of two cases: ~g - 0
or all xgk - 0. We may call bg~ . Hgfn the basic needs of household n, because
it represents committed expenditures if the household does not refer to other
households at all, or if all other households are just able to satisfy their
own basic needs. It is only the excess of other households' expenditures on
good g over their basic needs which raises committed expenditurea.3)
Discussion of the specification
The model is closely related to the ones analyzed by Gaertner (1974)
and Pollak (1976), although these authors do not take into account demographic
variables. Both authors mainly consider dynamic specifications in which the
xgk on the right hand side of (2.4) are lagged one period. Gaertner also ape-
cifies a relation for ~g, where an individual's yg depends on relative changes
in his permanent income. Furthermore, he considers various specifications in
which the reference weights depend on consumption patterna of individuals.
Both Gaertner and Pollek allow the reference weights to vary according to
goods and also to be non-zero for k-n. Since for our empirical work we only
have cross-section data available, a dynamic specification is ruled out. As-
suming that the weight w~ an individual gives to his own conaumption is the
same for everyone, it is impossible in a cross-section to distinguish empiri-
cally between w~ - 0 or w~ ~ 0. So, taking w~ z 0 ('no habit formation')
does not entail loss of generality (although the interpretation of parameter
estimates depends on it). Alternatively, it may be argued that wM ~e 0 dces
not make sense in a static framework.
Also, we do not follow Gaertner's lead to specify a model for ~ and
the w~, and in contrast to both Gaertner and Pollak the reference weigh~s w~
are assumed identical across commodities up to a constant of proportionality.
These are major simplifications, inspired by our wish to have a model that can
be estimated empirically.
It might be objected to the approach adopted by Gaertner, Pollak and
by us that there is no clear theoretical reason why the notion of interdepen-
dence would be best captured by a linear weighting scheme like (2.4). One
could argue that, for example, individuals will refer mainly to others with a
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higher consumption level. Evidence from social psychology seems to be ambigu-
ous in this respect. For instance, in studies that deal with feelings of equi-
ty about renumeration within organizations some find that individuals compare
their income to others who are just above them and other studies report that
individuals refer mainly to people who are just below them (cf. Von Grumbkov
1980, and references therein). Altogether, therefore, a linear weighting
scheme does not seem inconsistent with the available evidence.
It is worth noticing that the bgn are often interpreted as subsistence
levels, so that (2.6) implies that subsistence levels are subject to social
influences. In this connection it is of interest to mention some pieces of
evidence collected by Smolensky (1965), Ornati (1966), and Mack ( published in
Miller, 1965, and quoted by Kilpatrick, 1973). In various budget studies, from
1903 till 1960, experts have estimated minimum subsistence levels for the U.S.
It turns out that the regressions of the log of these subsistence levels on
the log of real disposable income per capita in the seme year yields elastici-
ties between 0.57 end 0.84. This suggests strongly that, indeed, subsistence
levels are subject to sociel influences. Similarly, responses to the survey
question "What is the smallest amount of money a family of four needs each
week to get along in this communityl" have shown a trend over time, which is
strongly correlated with per capita income (Kilpatrick, 1973, Sawhill, 1988).
3. Stochastic Specification
Combining (2.1), (2.5) and (2.6) and adding en i.i.d. disturbance term, egn,
representing all effects on xgn not captured by the systematic part of the
model, yields
r N 1 N
xgn - bg0 t Hglllfn - Pg ï wnkfkJ . gg i wnkxgk .
k-1 k-1
a yg Lyn - hE1 ~h kE1 wnkxhk1 } Yg LhF1 ~huh k~1 wnkfk -
G
- i bh~ - Hfn t Egn. (3.1)
h-1
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where u~ iG K. Thus, the model relates expenditures on different goods xB'1 g gn
to total expenditures and family size (yn and fn) and expenditures on diffe-
rent goods and family size of others (xgk and fk) through a linear model with
parameters bgG, gg, ~rg, y,g and w~. The main problem i n estimating the model
is of course created by the large number of reference weights w~. A related
problem is the simultaneíty in the system caused by the presence of the xgk on
both the left and the right hand side.
In earlier work (Van de Stadt, Kapteyn, Van de Geer, 1985). in a dif-
ferent context, we have adopted the following approach to the estimation of
the reference weights w~: It is intuitively plausible that consumers with a
given set of personal characteristics (education, job, age, etc.) will on
average attach a higher weight to expenditures of consumers sharing the same
characteristics, than to those of consumers who have different characteris-
tics.~) This notion can be used to parameterize the weights w~ auch that they
become a function of the similarity in characteristics between consumers n and
k. This function should of course contain a much lower number of parameters
than N(N-1), the number of linearly independent reference weighta. Given such
a parameterization, estimation of the newly introduced parameters along with
the other ones becomes feasible, and dces not only yield eatimates of the
demand system parameters but also of the reference pattern between groups in
society.
Attempts to estimate such reference patterns directly were made by
Kapteyn, (1977) and Kapteyn, Van Praeg and Van Herwaarden ( 1978). It leads to
very complicated models which are costly to estimate. The estimates of the
paremeters describing the pattern of reference weights tend to be unreliable.
In this paper we opt for a different, simpler approach: the reference weights
are considered to be drawings from a multivariate probability distribution. We
do not specify this distribution completely, but make a few assumptions that
partly characterize the distribution.
A central concept in our approach i s the notion of a social Qroup,
i.e. a set of people who share certain characteristics like education, age,
type of job, etc. The idea is to use the social group to which an individusl
belongs as a proxy for his reference group. To make clear under what circum-
stances such a procedure is justified and what errors of approximation may be
involved, we make four explicit assumptions. These four assumptions are listed
and discussed in appendix A. Here we only mention the main implication of the
assumptions.
The parameters in (3.1) are estimated by first deriving the reduced
form. It turns out that in this reduced form expressions like Ekw~yk, where
yk ~ yk - Hfk, appear as exogenous variables. The assumptions in appendix A
allow us to approximate these variables as follows (cf. A.14):
i w~Yk - xn '(1-x)Yn 4 vnk
(3.2)
where yn is the mean of yk of all families in the social group of individusl
n, i~ is the mean of all yk in society, vn is an error term that up to terms of
oP(1)5) is uncorrelated with yn end has mean zero. The interpretation of the
parameter x is that (1-x) is en indicator of the share of the total reference
weight that people assign, on average, to others within the same sociel group,
whereas x is the share given, on average, to all people in society, irrespec-
tive of whether they are within or outside an individual's socisl group. So,
if x-0, reference groups do not extend beyond one`s own social group. If x-1,
the social group contains no information whatever on one's reference group. In
other words, the smaller x is, the better a proxy one's social group is for
one's reference group. Of course, even if x-0 the sociel group is not a per-
fect proxy as long as the vn are not identically equal to zero.
Given the approximation (3.2) the reduced form of (3.1) takes a simple
form, as will appear in the next section.
4. The reduced form and identification
It is shown in appendix B that under the assumptions listed in appendix A,
(3.1) implies the following reduced form
xgn - dg ; ágYn t agfn t rgYn - r-lifn i ugn, (4.1)
where yn is mean total consumption end fn is mean family size in the social
group of individual n. The reduced-form parameters can be expressed in the
structural parameters as follows:
rg ~ (1-x)pg
P - PK




G gQ yg G yQ




sg ~ bgo - YB hFl bh0 ' xPg(~t - x~)
G phsh G Yh
Y~- F ~ï
h-1 1-~ h-1 1-Rh
ag ~ Hg - ~`g -
It is easy to see that ag, rg, pg and dg add up to zero, when summing over
goods. The error term ugn is well-behaved in the sense that up to terms of-10(N ) it has mean zero and is uncorrelated with the other variables on the
right hand side of (4.1).
Under our assumptions, the reduced form parameters dg, yg, ag, rg and
u can be estimated consistently from cross-section data (some details follow
in section 5). Knowing, or consistently estimating, the reduced form parame-
ters does not suffice, however, to determine ell structural parameters. This
can be seen as follows. Uae (4.3) to solve for g:6
PQ t pXR












It Follows from the analysis in appendix B(last paragraph) that, even with x
known, p is unidentifi~d. Since x is unknown as well, we are lacking two pie-
ces of information for the identification of the ~Bg. Assuming that 0 5 x C 1,we are able, however, to infer a rankinQ of ~Bg's from the reduced form esti-
mates:
rrr h
Sg ~ ah `~ ~g . rg ~ yh t rh ' (4.11)
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The structural parameters xg can be identified from the ag and yt.
Notice that without interdependence the xg would not be identified, since the
ag sum to zero. Consequently, we would have had only G-1 independent pieces of
information to identify the G parameters xg. It is the presence of fn which
mekes it possible to identify the sum of the xg, k. which provides the extra
piece of information required.
The G parameters b~ cannot be identified from (4.5), because the d
gsum to zero. Since the b~ are of no particular interest we do not pay further
attention to either the b~ or the dg.
5. Estimation results
Model (3.1) has been estimated using data on 2813 households from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey 1981 conducted by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statis-
tics. As mentioned in section 2, households have been assigned to social
groups with identical characteristics. The characteristics considered are the
following ones:
s) Educational attainment of head of household (3 categories distinguished);
b) Age of head of household (5 categories);
c) Type of job (5 categories).
This leads to a maximum of ~5 distinct social groups, 56 of which appeared to
be represented in the sample.
The variables yn and fn in (4.1) refer to population means in the
social group to which individual n belongs. Obvious proxies for yn and fn are
the corresponding sample means. Care has been taken, however, for each indivi-
dual n to base the estimate of yn and fn only on the incomes and family sizes
of all other sample households in the sociel group. Of course, replacement of
yn and fn by sample means introduces measurement errors, but the variance-
covariance matrix of ineasurement errors in yn and fn corresponding to group t
can be estimated unbiasedly by 1~(I~t-1) times the sample covaríance matrix of
yn and fn corresponding to social group t, where Nt is the number of consumers
in the sample belonging to social group t.
The model has been estimated by means of the LISREL program (Jtlreskog
and Stlrbom, 1981, Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn and Wansbeek, 1984, Bentler, 1983).
Under the conditions given in lemma 4 in appendix B the LISREL output provides
conaistent estimates of the reduced form parameters, and the printed standard
errors can serve as asymptotic approximations of the true standard errors of
the estimates.
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Two sets of estimates of model (3.1) will be presented, one ignoring
the measurement error caused by the use of proxies for yn and fn, and one
taking into account this measurement error. In the latter case the estimated
variance-covariance matrices of ineasurement errors per group have been ave-
raged over the groups. ( Correlation of ineasurement error across indivlduals in
the same group has been ignored.) This average error variance-covariance ma-
trix indicates that measurement error accounts for 2.3X uf the observed vari-
ance of yn, for 22.1X of that of fn, and for 1.3X of the covariance of yn and
f .n








The correlation matrix of all variables involved plus their sample means and
standard deviations, are given in an appendix available upon request.
Because of adding up restrictiona the variance-covariance matrix of
the uln ""'uGn is singular and the parameters satisfy retrictions across
equations. As usual, these problems can be accounted for by dropping arbitra-
rily one of the seven equations (cf. Barten, 1969). We have chosen to drop the
equation for other expenditures.
The survey records money outlays. In the case of durables these may
have an investment character, so that recorded outlay is only a poor proxy of
the true consumption of this durable. This is a case of ineasurement error in
an endogenous variable, which worsens the fit of the model, but doea not af-
fect the consistency of the parameter estimates, assuming that the measurement
error is distributed independently of the exogenous variablea.
All money amounts are measured in thousands of guilders per annum.
Family size fn is simply defined as the number of inembers of household n. The
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form disturbances of the six main-
tained equations has been left unrestricted.
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The resulta for different specifications of the model are given in
table 1. The x2-statistic is an indicator of the extent to which the model ia
compatible with the data.
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Table 1. Estimation results













o.13i (0.004) 0.131 (0.004)
0.274 (0.006) 0.274 (0.006)
0.081 (0.003) 0.081 (0.003)
0.094 {0.003) 0.094 (0.003)
o.17z (0.015) 0.172 (0.005)
0.238 (0.006) 0.238 (0.006)
-0.021 (0.007) -0.020 (0.007)
O.o52 (O.o13) 0.052 (0.013)
-0.003 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005)
0.018 (0.006) o.oi8 (0.006)
-0.004 (0.009) -0.004 (0.009)
-0.045 (o.oi2) -0.045 (0.012)
1.265 (o.i54) i.265 (0.154)
0.828 (0.360) 0.828 (0.361)
0.492 (o.ioo) 0.491 (o.loo)
0.543 (o.i25) 0.543 (o.i25)
0.517 (0.212) 0.5i7 (0.213)
0.390 (0.276) 0.389 (o.z77)
u 4.i31 (1.223) 4.129 (i.225)









a) Rg is defined as 1- oug~var(x~)























Let us first consider the column 'complete model', which presents the
results for the model which takes into account measurement errors in y andn
fn. According to the x2-statistic the model describes the data well. The esti-
mates of all rs are positive and significantly different from zero. Out of the
six estimated rg, four are significantly different from zero.
The column headed 'no measurement error' presents the estimates of the
model fnr the case that the proxies for yn and fn are assumed accurate. This
neglect of ineasurement error does not affect the estimates of the ~r or the
gvalues of the x2-statistic up to two decimal places.
The column headed 'no interdependence' presents parameter estimates
under the restriction rl - r2 -... r6 - 0. Although the fit of the equations,
as gauged by the R2's, hardly changes and the Yg and ag change only marginal-
2ly, the x-statistic rejects the restrictions decisively. As a final comment
on the statistical quality of the results, a x2-test of the overidentifying
restrictions on the ccefficients of fn end fn dces not lead to a rejection.
To start off a discussion of the economic significance of the results,
we present information on the structural parameters in table 2. (The last
column will be used later on).
Table 2. Values of structural parameters derived from the reduced form esti-




~r ~rB B uB ~B YB4rB
1. Fooa -0.19 l.z~ 0.13 0.11
2. Housing o.16 0.83 0.27 0.33
3. Clothing -0.04 0.49 0.08 0.08
4. Medical care 0.16 0.54 0.09 0.11
5. Fducation -0.02 0.52 0.1~ 0.1~
6. Transportation -0.23 0.39 0.24 0.19
Although the gg are not identified, we cen derive their relative ran-
king from table 2 in conjunction with relation (4.11), assuming that 0( x C 1
end all 0 C gg C 1. We find p2 ~~4 ~~5 ~ a3 ~~6 ~ gl. Interpreting pg as a
measure of the conspicuousness of good g, we have that the order of conspi-
cuousness is: housing, medical care, educatíon~entertainment, clothing, trans-
portatíon, food. Except, maybe, for the relative ranking of inedical care and
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transportation (cars), the ranking seems quite plausible. As to the position
of inedical care: this category comprises 'domeatic services', a high ranking
of which seems intuitively plausible. Moreover, there is an artefact at work
here, as most households in the sample were compulsory insured via the sick
fund, the contributions to which depend on income and hence, statistically,
also on total expenditures in the reference group.
It is of interest to compare predictions of the aodel for aggregates
of all consumers with predictions at the household level. Consider for in-
stance an increase of total expenditures by one dollar. At the household levei
the effect on the expenditures xgn is given by the marginal budget shares ~r .
8It follows from (4.1)-(4.8) that an increase of everyone's total ex-
penditures with one dollar raises each x with6'~)gn
~ yhi ~ E .-Sg hl -~h (5.1)
So the extent to which the aggregate consumption of a good responds to
changes in total expenditures does not only depend on the good's marginal
budget share, but also on its conspicuousness. One sees that the magnitude of
the response for good g is positively related to both its marginal budget
share and its conspicuousness.
If x~0 it is easy to show that (5.1) is equal to ~rg . rg. Assuming for
a moment that x-0, the last two columns of table 2 can be used to compare the
effect of an increase in total expenditures at the household level end in the
aggregate. As one would expect, at the aggregate level effects are larger for
conspicuous goods and lower for non-conspicuous goods. Differences can be
fairly large. For food, for example, the aggregate effect ia about 20X lower
than at the household level whereas for housing the aggregate effect is about
20X larger.
In the (standard) model without interdependence individuel and aggre-
gate effects are of course identical. If one looks at the estimates of the
marginal budget shares in the standard model, these appear to be somewhat in
between ~rg and ~g . rg for the complete model. For certain goods the standard
model would yield rather misleading predictions of aggregate effects. Taking
the complete model as being correct, the standard model would overpredict
aggregate effects for food by about 20X, whereas for housing the predictions
would be about lOX too low.
Finally we pay attention to the u's. An easy way to get a feeling for
their interpretation is to look at an example. If a family's size increases
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by one person, the utility function (2.2) implies that the extra expenditures
required on each category to maintain the family's previous utility level are:
food, Dfl. 1200 per annum; housing, Dfl. 500; clothing, Dfl. 400; medical
care, Dfl. 400; education~entertainment, Dfl. 400; transportation, Dfl. 150.
(A Dutch guilder is approximately U.S. E 0.50) These appear to be plausible
numbers. Recall from section 4 incidentally that without interdependence the
family size ccefficients are not identified.
6. ConcludinQ remarks
The main purpose of this paper has been to ahow that preference interdepen-
dence cen be incorporated in a demand system end to investigate its empirical
importance. The results confírm the suspicion that preference interdependence
is an importent determinant of consumer behavior; not so much for the extra
variance in consumption which can be thus explained nor for the paremeter
estimates, most of which do not change very much, but certain conclusions from
the model (e.g. what is the effect of an across-the-board change in total
expenditures on the aggregate consumption of various goods7) do change rather
substantially if preference interdependence is accounted for. So, to the ex-
tent that we went to use a model to predict aggregate responses to changes in
exogenoua variablea, interdependence should not be neglected.
As noted in section 2, the allocation of total expenditures to a num-
ber of expenditure categories can be seen as the second stage in the typical
two stage budgetting process that arises in life cycle models with intertempo-
rally separable preferences. Here we have restricted ourselves to the second
stage, but generally one would surmise that also in the first stage (the de-
termination of the level of total expenditures in an,y one period) preference
interdependence may play a role. Modelling this would probably bring us close
to an integration of Duesenberry's relative income hypothesis and Friedman's
permanent income hypothesis.
Although spelling out the stochastic assumptions that are requíred to
arrive at a well-behaved reduced form asks for a fair amount of space (appen-
dix A), and although the derivation of thia reduced form ia rather tedious
(appendix B), the result is quite simple. Estimation of the model by means of
the widely available LISREL computer progrem is, moreover, straightforward.
This suggests that there is really no practical reason to ignore preference
interdependence in demand analysis or in other empirical applications of mi-
cro-economic theory. Obvious extensions of the analysis in this paper include
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preference interdependence in labor-supply models and oligopolistic models of
firm behavior. Lemma 1 of appendix B provides a rather general framework for
the study of interdependencies in linear models of interdependent behavior. Of
course, most of the simplicity is due to the linearity of the specification.
FLture work should be directed towards an extension of the analysis to more
flexible specifications.
A second extension is to supplement preference interdependence with
habit formation. Not only will that probably increase the explanatory power of
the model, it will also aid in identifying the structural parameters. This
extension requires the availability of panel data.
A third extension has to be in the modelling of reference groups. In
this paper we have basically described the distribution of reference weights
by means of one parameter x. It should be possible to refine this specifica-
tion. Ideally, of course, one would like to have a formal theory of how refe-
rence groups are formed. To our knowledge no such theory exists at this mo-
ment.
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Appendix A. Stochastic assumptions
Here we introduce and discuss four assumptions that justify the approximation
(3.2) and the reduced form given in section 3.
If indívidual n is a member of social group t, t-1,...,T, we denote
this as n E Gt, and we denote the size of social group t(i.e. the number of
individuals in it) as Nt. As in section 3 we define yk x yk -}ifk, which is in
effect translated total expenditures of household k.
Assumption 1. Within each social Qroup the yn are random drawinRS from a biva-
riate distribution with mean yn, i-e.
.
yn - yn ;n' (A.1)
where E;n a 0; ;n is distributed independently from yn and w~ for any n and
k.
As a matter of notation, notice that yn is constant within a social
group. Sometimes we shall write yt for the value of yn with n E Gt.
r
Let n, yn and pns and pn de defined as
~~ NLNtytt
yn ~ N1N F Nsys, n E Gt
t stt
pns ~ ï w~ n E Gt, s~ tkEGs







We wil refer to i~ as mean translated consumption (mean total expenditures) in
tiwsociety, and to yn as mean translated consumption outside individual n's so-
cial group. Obviously, pns is the total reference weight assigned by indivi-
dual n to all individuals in social group s, whereas pn is the total reference
weight assigned by this individual to all individuals in his own social group.
Assumption 2
sf t
pns (ys - Yn, -~n fYt - R, ' op (1) .
where o~n i s expected to be positive
(The symbol op(1) has been defined in footnote 5).
n ECt (A.6)
The left hand side of (A.6) can be interpreted roughly as a covariance between
the mean consumption level of a social group and the total reference weight
assigned to it. Equation (A.6) says that this covarience tends to be positive
if individual n belongs to a socisl group with an above average level of con-
sumption and that it will be negative if individusl n belongs to a socisl
group with a below average consumption level. The motivation for the assump-
tion is that generally, one would expect that people will more often tend to
assign reference weights to others who are similar (see footnote 4) than to
others who are dissimilar. Thus, generally if someone has a high consumption
level he will assign on average more weight to others who also have a high
consumption level. This induces a correlation between references weights and
consumption levels which is positive. On the other hand, someone with a low
consumption level will primarily give weights to others with a low consumption
level. This induces a negative correlation between reference weights and con-
sumption. Assumption 2 is a simple way to capture these effects.
As mentioned in section 3, in the reduced form of the system (3.1) a
variable like E w~ yk appears. The two assumptions made so far allow us tok
circumvent the problem of having to specify the reference weights w~. To see
this, first notice that (A.2) and (A.3) imply










vn is a random variable with zero mean and independent of yn, yn. We have
kw~Yk -kw~Yk 'rn-PnYn i s~tpnsys; ~n
... i ~ M, ~ ~- Ml 4 V
- pn Yn (s~t pnsJ Yn s~t pns Ys - YnJ n
~
- Pn Yn '(1 - Pn)Yn t an Yn - n t op(1) t vn
Using (A.8) this carries over into










To gain some intuition for the meaning of Kn, let us consider some
extreme cases. First, suppose pn - 1, i .e. individual n only assigns weights
to others wíthin the same social group. From (A.6) it is clear that then,
generally, an - 0. Thus xn - 0 and (A.11) reduces to
E wnky'k - yn . vn . op(1).
k
Since individual n's reference group is confined within his social group, the
socíel group mean yn is a"perfect" indicator of the mean consumption in his
reference group.
Next, suppose Kn - 1. Then (A.11) reduces to
20
k
i w~Yk - R' vn t or (1) .
Obviously, the social group mean now does not convey any information about the
mean consumption in the reference group of individuel n.
Basically, (A.11) reduces the number of unknown paremeters from about
N(N-1) to about N. A further reduction of the number of unknown parameters is
obtained by assumption 3.
Assumption 3
xn - x 4 bn, (A.13)
where bn is a random variable with mean zero; bn and bk are independentlv
distributed for ntk, bn is independent of w~ for k~n, ,L-1,...,N.
This assumption mainly serves to further reduce the number of unknown parame-
ters. In particular, it implies a further simplicification of (A.11)
E
k wnkyk - (1-x)Yn f x~ t vn - bnlyn - i~J . op(1) (A.14)
Under the above assumptions, vn - bnlyn - i~J is independent of yn. So, rather
than having N(N-1) reference weightslllto deal with we are left with one unknown
parameter x.
To arrive at a reduced form with a well-behaved error term we need one
more assumption. Define w~) . F~w~w~ and w~) . ikwnkwkm-1) for ,C ) 2,
Assumption 4 Ew~) - 0(N-1), for .l z 2.
Notice that w~) is the weight assigned by n to m'via sll others'. Assumption
4 therefore states that on average the indirect influence of eny individual on
any other individual will tend to zero if the number of individuals in society
tends to infinity.
For the derivation of the reduced form we shall employ the following





The proof of (A.15) is an application of Chebychev's Lemma.
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Appendix B. Derivation of the reduced form
This appendix presents the derivation of the reduced form ( 4.1) under the
assumption given in appendix A. We first derive a version of (4.1) in terms of
translated variables, and then adapt the results by including family size.
Let
x ~ (xll~.. ,x1N,.. ,xGl, . .x~)'. GNxl
b ! (bi1~...,b1N,...,bGl,...,b~)'. GNxl
bG s (b10,...,b~)'. Gxl
~ ' (X1,....ëG)'. Gxl
Y ' (Y1.....YN)'.
B ~

















P ' (P1.....PG)'' Gxl (B.11)
~ ~ (~1.....~G)'. Gxl (B.12)
Let i denote a vector of ones, with a subscript that indicates its length.
(So, e.g. BiG - j3.) Equation (3.1), can now be written as
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x- b09tN r(B9W)x r Ye{y' - (~GeIN)(b09tN r(BBW)x)} r e-
- oe~N r{(B - rH')~w}X r xe`y r e,
where c is defined as
c ~ b0 - iGbOyr.
ob~iously, ~~c - o.
To state our first lemma we need a number of definitíons:
A~B-YA'
P ' CI~ - (1-x)A]-1Ax






z ~ (1-x)y r xn~p. (B.18)
FWrthermore, let b.(b1,...,bN)', Y~ diag~yl,...,YN~, v~(v1,...,vN)'.
Lemma 1. Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, (B.13) implies
x- W9~N . a-8y r p9z r u,
where u satisfies:
( I~ - A9W ) u ~ E - p9 I Y- i},INJ b r Aar9v r op(1) .
(8.19)
(B.20)
Proof We show that substitution of (B.19) in (B.13) leads to an identity with
u satisfying (B.2o). Fyuations (B.19) ana (B.13) imply
W9tN r éBy r p8z r u- c9~N r(A9W) {y~tN r ~rBy r pBz r u} r Dr9Y r E.
(B.21)
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or, using WtN - ~N'
WBiN - cBtN - AwBtN 4 p9z - AyBWy' - Ap~Wz t(IGN - ABW)u - e. (B.22)
Since, according to (B.17), w- Aa - c i xnAp, the first three terms of the
left-hand side of (B.22) are equal to xi~Ap6tN. So we have
(1GN - ANW)u - E a AarBWy i Ap~Wz - P~z - xnAp~tN. (B.23)
From (A.14) and using (B.18) we have
WY -(1-x)Y t xRiN i v- IY - r~INJb t op(1) -
-z.v- IY-~,INJ b.op(1). (8.24)
Since from (A.1) and (A.9) Wy - Wy - v, we have for Wz (using again B.18):
Wz - Í1-x)Wy . x~tiN -(1-x){z - fY -~tlN,b t opÍl)} i xn~N. (8.25)
Collecting terms, we find for (B.23):
(IGN - ABW)u - Aar9z . (1-x)Ap~z - p~z t e . Ay9v -
- ~Aàr t (1-x)AP]B LY - TtINJ b . op(1). (B.26)




: ION ~ ABW r A26W2 . A3~W3 t... (B.27)
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Proof For any integer ,l ) 1:
LI~ ~ A8W t A29W2 t... . A(~-1)9W(~-1) J [I~ - A9W~ -
- IGN - A~BW~. (8.28)
So to prove (B.27) it is sufficient to prove that A~BW~ converges to zero if .l
tends to infinity. Since W is e Markov matrix, W~ is a Markov matrix as well.
Hence the elements of W~ are bounded (they have values between zero and one).
It is therefore sufficient to prove that A~ ~ 0 for .l to infinity. We show
thia by proving that the eigenvalues of A are ell within the unit circle (O1-
denburger, 1940).
First assume that all gg are different and strictly positive. Then the
eigenvalues of A follow from the determinantal equation
~A - AIGI - IB - aIG - YP'I - IP - aIG~ {1 - A'(B - aIG)-lY} - G.
The expression between braces equals
(B.29)
i~(B - aIG)(B - aIG)-ly - A'(B - aIG)-lá - -aiG(B - aIG)-lë. (B.3o)






Each of the terms under the summation sign is an orthogonal hyperbola in ~
with a-gg as its vertical asymptote. So (B.31) has a solution between each two
successive pg, giving the remaining G-1 roots of (B.29). So all roots are non-
negative and amaller than the largest gg, which by assumption is less then 1.
This still holds when not all gg are different or strictly positive.
This Follows directly from the continuity of eigenvalues of s matrix as a
function of its elements. o
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Lemma Under assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 and ignorinQ terms of order op(1), the
vector u satisfying (B.22) has mean zero and
Euy'' - A~BEW ~ 0(N-1). (B.32)
Proof Use lemma 2 to rewrite (B.20) as
- E A~pBW~IY - nINJb t op(1).
~-2 l
u - (I~ - A9W)-1{E r ~v} - (IG t A)p9WIY - nlNlb -
(A.15)
So we have for u,
(B.34)
u'(I~ - A~W)-1{E f A~Bv} -(IG t A) p~WIY - RIN,b f op(1). (B.35)
The first term on the right hand side invollllves E and v. W; where j.
(b1,...,~N)'. Since both e and ~ are independent of W, and have expectation
equal to zero, this first term has expectation zero as well. In the second
term the random variables are W and b. A typical element of W~Y - i~IN~b is
Ek~nfYk -~,wnkbk. Since bk has meen zero and is independentlof wnk for kWw,
this element has mean zero. Consequently the second term has mean zero. Neg-
lecting the op(1) term, we conclude that u has mean zero.
To prove the second part of the lemma, we first observe that b and e
are independent of y. So we only have to consider
E(IGN - AgW)-1(Aë'ev)Y~ ' E(IGN - A~W)-1(~WYY') -
implies
(B.33)
ï A~p9W~lY - T1INJb - E A~p~op(1) - A2(IO - A)-lp9op(1) - op(1).
~-2 lll ~-2
- E(IGN - A~W)-1(~e~(YY~)) - QyE(IGN - AgW)-1(AXBW). (B.36)
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where the second equality sign is based on the independence of W and ;. Next
we write
E(I~ - A9W)-1(Aèr9W) ' E{ArbW f A2y9W2 , A3Yew3 ....} -
- AreEw . A2~Ewz . A3r~Ew3 ~ ... -
' AëNEW , A2~p(N-1) 4 A3~0(N-1) . ... -
' AY9EW . A2(I-A)-1 b'BO(N-1) - Aë9EW . 0(N-1).
B.37)
where the third equality follows from assumption 4. o
Note that the diagonal elements of W are identically equsl to zero. As
a result, an element of u corresponding to a certain observation is uncorrela-
ted with the element of y corresponding to that same observation. Of course,
any element of u dces correlate with elements of y corresponding to different
observations, but that does not affect the asymptotic distribution of the ML-
estimator. This atatement is made somewhat more precise in lemma 4.
Let us define the 'conventional' ML-estimator of the reduced form
parameters y, y, and p in (B.19) as the estimator that maximizea the likeli-
hood of the observations under the assumption that u follows a normal distri-
bution (with mean zero) with a variance-covariance matrix of the form E9IN,
where E is unrestricted. This estimator provides us with consistent estimates
of y, Y, and p under assumptions 1-4, but in order to use the corresponding
conventional standard errors an extra assumption is needed. This is summa-
rized, somewhat informally, in lemma 4.
Lemma 4 Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, the conventional ML-estimator of the
reduced form parameters is consistent. If we strenQthen assumption 4 to
E wnm - ~(N-1).
then the conventional standard errors are consistent estimates of the true
standard errors.
za
Proof To prove the first part, ignore for a moment the overidentifying re-
striction implicit in the definitions of x and y(both depend on the u-s).
Then (B.19) is simply a system of seemingly unrelated regressions where the
same explanatory variables appear in each equation. Consequently, the conven-
tional ML-estimator is identical to the OLS-estimator applied equation b.y
equation. Since the diagonal elements of W are identically equal to zero, it
follows from lemma 3 that the elements of u are uncorrelated with the explana-
tory variables corresponding to the same observation. It follows immediately
that the OLS-estimator is consistent. Now, taking into account the overidenti-
fying restrictions does not impair consistency.
Concerning the second part of the lemma, we observe that the strength-
ened version of asaumption 4 in conjunction with lemma 3 implies that we cen
neglect the correlation between u and y. Furthermore, considering (B.33) it is
clear that the only source of correlation of elements of u across observations
eríses from terms involving W. By asaumption these terms can be neglected. As
a result u has the varience covariance matrix assumed by the conventional ML-
estimator and its standard errors are consistent estimates of the true atan-
dard errors of the parameter estimates.
To conclude the derivation of the reduced form, we rewrite (B.19) in terms of
non-translated variables. Define:
d ~ w t nxP
a ` H - Në
r ~ (1-x)p.
Now we have
Lemma Under assumptions 1-4, (B.19) implies





Up to terms of 0(N-1) the error term u has mean zero and ugn is uncorrelated
with yn and fn. Lemma 4 applies.
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The error term u satisfies an expreasion similar to (B.22) and the
properties of u follow from arguments similar to lemma 3. It is also e matter
of analogy to prove that lemma 4 applies, except for one slight complication.
In (B.41) there are overidentifying restrictions on the reduced form pareme-
ters so that ML is no longer identical to OLS equation by equatíon. Since
imposition of correct restrictions does not impair consistency, the consisten-
cy of the ML-estimator still follows from the consistency of the OLS-estima-
tor.
Finally we substantiate the remark following (4.10) in section 4, by
using (B.16) to express s as a function of Y, p end K. First rewrite (B.,16)
as
Ay . (1-K)AP - P (B.42)
or
(IG - x~~)B(x t (1-x)P) - P- (B.43)
Let e be the diagonal matrix with typical diagonal element ~g t(1-x)pg. Then
(B.43) is equivalent to
(IG - ët~)~S ' P. (8.44)
As IG - ~re~ has rank G-1, ep can not uniquely be inferred from (B.44). Using
the algebra of singular linear systems ( e.g. Searle, 1971), the general solu-
tion of (8.44) is, for arbitrary p,
oR -(IG - Xi~)P ~ PX - P t PX
or
(8.45)
P- ó 1(P 4 Px). (8.46)
This is equivalent to (4.9).
Notes
1) For the purpose of this paper we use the terms 'household', 'family', 'in-
dividual', 'consumer' as synonyms.
2) Notice that in (2.3) the prices of all goods are equal to one. Since we
will be dealing with a cross-section where all consumers face the same
prices, this does not involve any loss of generality. As a result we will
use 'consumption' and 'expenditurea' es synonyms.
3) It would be tempting to call xgn 'discretionary spending' on good g, but we
prefer to adhere to the more common definition of discretionary spending as
x - bgn gn~
4) It follows form Festinger's theory of sociel comparison processes (Festin-
ger, 1954) that people will compare primarily to others who are similar,
and a large amount of empirical evidence supports this contention to vary-
ing degrees. Borrowing from attribution theory, Goethals and Darley (1977)
are able to be more specific about how "similar others" have to be defined.
If an individual wants to evaluate a particular abilíty, for example, he
will seek comparison with others who are comparable with respect to attri-
butes related to that ability. Major and Forcey (1985), find that in eva-
luations of the level of pay received for a job, individuals compare to
others who have the same job and sex.
5) The symbol op(1) is defined as follows: the random variable xm is op(1) if
for any E ) 0,
lim Pr(~xm~ ) e) - 0,
m-~
In the present context m refers to the number of individuals in a social
group or in society. We shall use the symbol op(1) for both scalars, vec-
tors and matrices.
6) Here and in what follows we ignore the supply side of the market for con-
sumption goods, i. e. we assume that changing demands can be met without
affecting prices. This allows us to equate demand with consumption.
31
7) It is somewhat tedious to show this; (5.1) can be derived more directly by
using (B.16), (B.17) and (B.19).
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